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In response to Mark A. Geistfeld, The Doctrinal Unity of Alternative Li-
ability and Market-Share Liability, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006). 
 
In his provocative and insightful article, The Doctrinal Unity of Alter-
native Liability and Market-Share Liability,
1
 Professor Mark Geistfeld prof-
fers several interesting theses about market-share liability, causation, 
and evidence.  Three of the more moderate theses are: 
(1)  Cases like Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories
2
 need not be understood as 
supplanting causation-based liability with risk-creation liability. 
(2)  Evidentiary considerations in fact played a leading role in Sindell, 
and, if properly interpreted, could explain both Sindell and certain forms 
of market-share liability in a manner that fully retains traditional causa-
tion notion rules, and does not depend on any novel risk-creation prin-
ciples. 
(3)  The rationale underlying Sindell and certain forms of market-share 
liability shares a great deal with the principles underlying Summers v. 
Tice,
3
 which is regarded as quite uncontroversial. 
I agree with all three of these theses.  Indeed, I, along with Profes-
sor Arthur Ripstein, defended these claims about Sindell, Summers, 
market-share liability, and alternative liability several years ago, in an 
article from which Professor Geistfeld quotes approvingly.
4
  Professor 
Geistfeld goes well beyond the claims in that article, however, advanc-
ing a proposal that is far reaching in its implications for law revision, 
and profound in its theoretical import. 
Geistfeld’s project, in broad form, is to bring together a variety of 
different bases for joint and several liability that operate by means of 
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1
155 U. PA. L. REV. 447 (2006). 
2
607 P.2d 924, 938 (Cal. 1980) (constructing and imposing market-share liability 
on manufacturers of the drug DES). 
3
199 P.2d 1, 5 (Cal. 1948) (holding that defendants, who had each negligently 
fired shotguns in the plaintiff’s direction and injured him, were each presumed to have 
caused injury, and therefore held to be jointly liable). 
4
See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 461 & n.38, 467 n.54, 484 n.102 (citing Arthur Rip-
stein & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in PHILOSOPHY 
AND THE LAW OF TORTS 214 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001)). 
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what he calls “evidential grouping,”
5
 without indulging a joint agency 
theory or a risk-contribution theory.  These include, in the first in-
stance:  the alternative liability of Summers v. Tice and the market-share 
liability of cases such as Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, as well as the spe-
cial concurrent causation rules both in the classic two-fire case of 
Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Railway,
6
 and con-
temporary cases involving multiple contributing toxic tortfeasors;
7
 and 
only somewhat less directly, in group res ipsa cases such as Ybarra v. 
Spangard.
8
  The principle most clearly expressed in the alternative li-
ability case of Summers v. Tice, according to Geistfeld, is the principle 
of evidential grouping—in basic form it explains the rationale under-
lying all of these cases: 
Once the plaintiff has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that 
(1) each defendant may have tortiously caused the harm, (2) one or 
more of the defendants did actually cause the harm, and (3) each de-
fendant would be subject to liability for having actually caused or con-
tributed to the harm, then no defendant can avoid liability by relying 
upon the tortious conduct of the other defendants, when that form of 
exculpatory causal proof would enable all of the defendants to avoid li-
ability. 
 To invoke this principle, the plaintiff must satisfy the ordinary burden 
of proving that each defendant is responsible for a tortious risk that may 
have actually caused or contributed to the harm.  In order for this proof 
to establish the plaintiff’s prima facie case, each defendant must also be 
subject to liability in the event that her tortious conduct actually caused 
or contributed to the harm.  With respect to the element of causation, 
the plaintiff must satisfy the ordinary burden of proof against the group 
of defendants.
9
 
Geistfeld seems not to appreciate just how broad this principle is.  
Consider the following hypothetical: 
 
5
Id. at 453. 
6
179 N.W. 45, 48-49 (Minn. 1920) (holding that a defendant who starts a fire that 
combines with other fires is liable for any destruction of property caused by the com-
bined fire if plaintiff can show that defendant’s fire was a material element in the 
property’s destruction). 
7
See, e.g., Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Balbos, 604 A.2d 445, 459 (Md. 1992) (“[T]he 
failure to warn on the part of any one supplier of an asbestos product to which a dece-
dent was exposed can operate as a concurrent proximate cause with the failures to 
warn on the part of other such suppliers.”). 
8
154 P.2d 687 (Cal. 1945) (applying an extended form of res ipsa loquitur to jus-
tify imposition of joint and several liability upon all members of a group of medical 
personnel present at and involved in plaintiff-patient’s surgery when plaintiff-patient in 
their care sustains an injury while unconscious). 
9
Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 469 (footnote omitted). 
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 Between 11:00 and 11:15 p.m. on Sunday, July 22, Robert Lupin was work-
ing at a construction site on the highway, quite near the entrance to a bridge cross-
ing.  Prominently posted signs indicated a reduced speed limit (25 mph, from 55 
mph) and additional prominent signs warned that the fines for speeding in this 
work zone were doubled.  However, virtually all of the cars on the road were travel-
ing between 50-60 mph.  Lupin needed to cross a lane in the construction zone 
and waited until another worker signaled for the traffic to stop, but a dark sedan 
nevertheless almost hit him (apparently not noticing him).  Lupin jumped out of 
the way, landing on an oil slick.  He fell on his face, breaking several teeth and 
his arm.  The traffic did not stop for a few minutes. 
 Using video cameras around the toll-booth area, Lupin’s personal injury law-
yer can identify forty dark sedans that were speeding significantly during the win-
dow of time that Lupin was injured, consistent with where he was injured.  He 
can therefore prove that each of these drivers “is responsible for a tortious risk that 
may have actually caused or contributed to the harm.” 
This is also a scenario in which “(1) each defendant may have tor-
tiously caused the harm, (2) one or more of the defendants did actu-
ally cause the harm, and (3) each defendant would be subject to liabil-
ity for having actually caused or contributed to the harm.”
10
  None of 
these defendants would be able to exculpate himself by saying, “it was 
not me, it was one of the other dark sedans.”  According to Geistfeld’s 
principle, there should be rebuttable joint and several liability for 
each of the forty drivers.  Each should be liable to Lupin unless the 
driver can prove that she was not involved. 
Three points should be made about this hypothetical.  First, this is 
not a fanciful or unrealistic case.  In cases involving automobile acci-
dents, defective products, or even in excessive force cases against po-
lice officers, it is the personal injury lawyer’s mundane reality that tort-
feasor identification can be very difficult.  And this is true even where 
it is possible to produce evidence of widespread tortious risk creation 
or tortious conduct, and even where it is possible for the plaintiff to 
circumscribe the potential causative agent to some degree. 
Second, under current law there would not be not liability in this 
case or cases like it; therefore, Geistfeld’s account from a descriptive 
or interpretive point of view is not plausible.  In both this hypothetical 
and the throngs of cases like it, there is no liability in our system.
11
  
 
10
Id. 
11
“A fundamental principle of traditional products liability law is that the plaintiff 
must prove that the defendants supplied the product which caused the injury.”  Gauld-
ing v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d 66, 68 (Tex. 1989); see also Fillmore v. Page, 358 F.3d 
496, 506-08 (7th Cir. 2004) (rejecting civil rights claim in which State actor who com-
mitted wrongful conduct against plaintiff was not identified); Rodrigues v. Gen. Elec. 
Corp., 204 F. Supp. 2d 975, 976 (E.D. Tex. 2001) (holding that failure to establish the 
fan causing plaintiff’s injury was made by defendant—and failure to rebut evidence to 
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Summers, Sindell, and Ybarra are exceptional:  “zebras,” as medical resi-
dents call them, not “horses.”
12
  Overwhelmingly, cases factually similar 
to the Lupin hypothetical are not brought.  A plaintiff’s lawyer who 
has no more information than that which I gave in the Lupin hypo-
thetical will abandon the case or choose to sue the Bridge and Tunnel 
Authority (perhaps preferring to attempt to prove duty or fault) and 
avoid an unbridgeable gap in causation.  And so it is that civil rights 
lawyers sue police departments and cities for what is really an individ-
ual’s act, products liability lawyers caught in such a bind sue industries 
rather than just manufacturers, and personal injury lawyers sue land-
owners, not perpetrators. 
Third—and here is the core of this Response—the arguments 
made from a normative point of view for the principle of evidential 
grouping are unsound.  Geistfeld offers three:  (a) a defendant may 
not shelter herself from liability by claiming a right to a procedural 
rule that favors her, if that rule is unfair; (b) defendants who reject 
evidence-based liability are taking mutually inconsistent positions; and 
(c) defendants who reject evidence-based liability are relying upon 
naked statistics in an unacceptable way.
13
 
(a) Unfair Procedural Rules:  It is of course true at some level that a 
defendant may not avail herself of the benefits of an unfair procedural 
rule.  But what counts as unfair, and why?  Geistfeld himself argues 
persuasively against the most popular, hornbook-style move in this 
scenario, which is to argue that it is only fair that the wrongful actor 
should bear the risk of evidentiary uncertainty.  That principle is un-
 
the contrary—undercut plaintiff’s claim); City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 
226 S.W.3d 110, 115-17 (Mo. 2007) (rejecting lead paint action in which plaintiffs 
could not identify particular defendants causing particular damage).  The lure of 
Summers’s reasoning—and the version of the reasoning that Geistfeld depicts—is un-
doubtedly powerful.  Indeed, the courts that routinely reject cases on the ground of 
inadequate tortfeasor identification frequently make a point of distinguishing Summers.  
See, e.g., Hessel v. O’Hearn, 977 F.2d 299, 304-05 (7th Cir. 1992) (Posner, J.) (rejecting 
plaintiffs’ civil rights claim against fourteen officers where there was no way to identify 
which officer stole plaintiffs’ items from the search scene, and reasoning that there was 
no evidence that each of them acted wrongfully, only that one of them did).  More 
generally, Dobbs’s treatise sets out a broad array of limitations on Summers.  See DAN B. 
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 175, at 428-29 (2000).  To see Summers as the rule—
doctrinally—and everything else as exceptions is to miss the forest for the trees.  Geist-
feld’s article does not make this error; its point is that the law should move to realize 
the principle of evidential grouping, not that it has done so. 
12
“When you hear hoofbeats, think horses, not zebras,” goes the medical resi-
dents’ maxim (meaning, roughly, that it is prudent to attribute symptoms to ordinary 
causes rather than exceptional ones). 
13
See Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 461, 466-68. 
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tenably broad, Geistfeld argues, because it would swamp all cases in 
which the proof of fault was strong but the proof of causation was 
weak.
14
 
Geistfeld needs to move beyond the word “unfair” and provide ei-
ther:  (i) a normative account of what makes certain attributes of a 
procedural and evidentiary system fair and others unfair; or (ii) a basis 
for cabining the fairness intuition that is so powerfully felt in Summers 
and Sindell so that it can drive intuitively satisfactory outcomes in some 
settings, without entirely overtaking the principle that a defendant 
who caused no harm cannot be held liable for harm; or (iii) an ac-
count of why particular features of Summers, Sindell, and other cases 
where courts have shifted the burden of proof on tortfeasor identifica-
tion, render it particularly justifiable from a normative point of view to 
alter the evidentiary and procedural framework, and why these fea-
tures are present in a wider array of settings than has generally been 
recognized.  Because Geistfeld provides none of the above, the “un-
fairness” argument is more rhetoric than substance.
15
 
(b) Inconsistency:  Geistfeld does not rest on “unfairness” alone; in-
stead, he offers an interesting argument that defendants in “evidential 
grouping” cases cannot consistently maintain their view.  Here is his 
argument: 
 The plaintiff’s evidence shows that she was injured by the group of 
defendant tortfeasors, and that each defendant is a member of that 
group.  Unless a defendant rebuts this evidence, she cannot reasonably 
deny that the plaintiff was harmed by one of the defendants, including 
herself.  The defendant, therefore, cannot avoid liability merely by arguing that 
the other defendants, more likely than not, caused the harm, if that same argu-
ment would enable every other defendant to avoid liability.  In these cir-
cumstances, the defendant’s argument effectively denies that the plaintiff was 
harmed by any of the defendants, including herself, even though the defendant’s 
failure to rebut the plaintiff’s proof disables the defendant from denying liability 
 
14
See id. at 456-58. 
15
To be sure, fact patterns like Summers and Sindell move judges and scholars to 
ask the larger question of whether the causation requirement of negligence law (and, 
to a great extent, tort law more generally) is itself fair.  This is a question I will not ad-
dress here, both because it is part of Geistfeld’s own project to justify evidential group-
ing and a broader form of market-share liability without jettisoning the causation re-
quirement and because I have addressed the defensibility and fairness of requiring 
causation in several other articles.  See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 221-22, 229-
31; see also John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Tort Law and Moral Luck, 93 
CORNELL L. REV. (forthcoming 2007) (replying to criticism that tort law’s causation 
requirement unfairly permits luck to carry too much weight in determining liability); 
John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Unrealized Torts, 88 VA. L. REV. 1625, 
1636–60 (2002) (arguing that tort does not permit recovery absent injury, and provid-
ing justification for this requirement). 
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on this basis.  To avoid this inconsistency, the defendant can only rely 
upon proof rebutting the plaintiff’s evidence.
16
 
The argument is unsound because it depends upon an ambiguity 
in the modifier “effectively” in the clause, “the defendant’s argument 
effectively denies that the plaintiff was harmed by any of the defen-
dants.”  “Effectively” can be used to suggest a practical equivalence or 
to suggest an equivalence in semantic content, and Geistfeld’s short 
argument that there is an inconsistency in the defendant’s position re-
lies upon an equivocation between these two.  If the clause is intended 
to convey that the defendant’s argument “has the same practical con-
sequences” as denying that the plaintiff was harmed by any of the de-
fendants, then it is true to say that the argument “effectively denies” it.  
But there is no actual inconsistency in making a statement that leads 
to the same practical consequences as an outright denial would.  
There is no contradiction.  Of course, if “effectively” in the phrase “ef-
fectively denies” is intended to connote “in essence denies” or “really 
denies” or “in meaning denies” or “not in so many words denies,” then 
we are in a different situation.  If it is accurate that the defendant is 
really denying that the plaintiff was harmed by one of the defendants, 
then (given the earlier part of Geistfeld’s paragraph), the defendant is 
in fact contradicting himself.  But the problem with Geistfeld’s argu-
ment is that the defendant is not really denying that the plaintiff was 
harmed by one of the defendants.  The defendant is denying that 
plaintiff can identify which particular defendant harmed her, and is 
asserting that proof of injurer identity is a sine qua non of recovery.  
There is no inconsistency here. 
(c) Naked Statistics:  Geistfeld’s most intriguing argument is the fol-
lowing: 
[W]hen every defendant attempts to avoid liability by relying upon the 
negligence of other defendants, they are resorting to “naked statistics” 
rather than particularistic proof, but “[j]udges generally have refused to 
accept naked statistics or ex ante causal probabilities as evidence of what 
actually happened on a particular occasion.”  The fact that the remain-
ing group of defendants probably caused the injury does not explain 
what happened in this particular case, as it implies that no defendant 
caused the harm, and yet the plaintiff has provided uncontested proof to 
the contrary.
17
 
 
16
Geistfeld, supra note 1, at 466 (emphasis added). 
17
Id. at 467-68 (footnote omitted) (quoting Richard W. Wright, Causation, Respon-
sibility, Risk, Probability, Naked Statistics, and Proof:  Pruning the Bramble Bush by Clarifying 
the Concepts, 73 IOWA L. REV. 1001, 1050-51 (1988)). 
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Four concerns emerge here, however.  First, Geistfeld’s language 
in this paragraph is mostly descriptive and doctrinal, rather than nor-
mative or explanatory.  However, on a descriptive front, as I have ar-
gued, it is quite clear that judges do not generally accept such “eviden-
tial grouping” claims. 
Second, naked statistics are deemed unacceptable if they are used 
to support one of the allegations that establish liability.  However, dis-
cussion of naked statistics being used to establish the plaintiff’s case is 
misplaced.  Rather, the real inquiry is determining what evidence 
would undermine the plaintiff’s case.  Perhaps more importantly, we 
are discussing whether the burden on a plaintiff to put forward a 
prima facie case should include a requirement of identifying a defen-
dant tortfeasor.  If anything, the ban on naked statistics to uphold 
what looks like a flimsy case on causation would seem to cut in favor of 
defendants, not against them.  Geistfeld seems to have forgotten that 
he is offering the naked statistics argument as an effort to justify the 
principle of evidential grouping, not as an argument over what would 
rebut a plaintiff’s claim, were the principle so accepted. 
Third, even if we assume that a plaintiff has a prima facie case, it is 
not obvious why a court’s disinclination to permit naked statistics on 
the liability-establishing front is a reason to reject naked statistics on 
the defendants’ side.  The literature on naked statistics is notoriously 
elusive and undertheorized, and it is simply not clear why limits on 
exculpation should parallel limits on inculpation. 
Finally, and perhaps most simply, is this really use of naked statis-
tics?  The case has not seriously been made that a defendant’s efforts 
to exculpate herself by pointing out that many others were similarly 
situated (and that plaintiff has not linked her tortiousness to the 
plaintiff’s injury) actually constitutes an effort to establish a fact by use 
of naked statistics.  It seems, rather, to be merely a means of emphasiz-
ing the underspecified nature of the evidence that the plaintiff has of-
fered against her. 
The basic shortcoming of Geistfeld’s “principle of evidential 
grouping” is that he mistakes the question his analysis yields for the 
answer to that question.  The categories that he so suggestively brings 
together are indeed illustrations of a basic phenomenon:  Due to the 
frequent difficulties plaintiffs encounter in identifying any individual 
tortious agent who can be shown to have been a but-for cause of the 
injury, a plaintiff’s lawyer will often take aim at a category of parties 
who may have tortiously caused the injury.  Moreover, in all of these 
cases, good lawyers, judges, and ordinary jurors are drawn to the idea 
of finessing the problem by shifting the burden of proof to the whole 
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group of defendants.  Yet Geistfeld (like Ripstein, myself, and the 
overwhelming majority of courts) takes as basic, both interpretively 
and normatively, that a defendant cannot be held liable for a plain-
tiff’s injury merely for creating the risk of injury; rather, the defendant 
must have actually caused the injury.  Moreover, Geistfeld does not be-
lieve that courts can simply assert an Orwellian redefinition of words:  
he believes that the set of procedural and evidentiary standards that 
courts set up to adjudicate causation must, while displaying a sense of 
pragmatism and fairness, nevertheless take seriously the idea that a de-
fendant should not be liable to a plaintiff unless that defendant 
caused plaintiff’s injury.
18
  Finally, in all of these cases, although it 
would circumvent the tortfeasor identification problem if one could 
plausibly depict factual or legal connections among the parties that 
would justify treating the group as a single, unified agent, for purposes 
of attributing responsibility, the facts are just not there to justify uni-
fied agency conceptualization. 
The question that Geistfeld’s synthesis invites is, therefore:  Given 
that the conditions he sets forth for evidential grouping are themselves insuffi-
cient to justify the creation of rebuttable joint and several liability, what makes 
evidential grouping permissible in these different doctrinal areas?  
Some of the answers are quite clear at this stage.  Concurrent causa-
tion cases challenge—correctly, in my view (and that of most tort 
scholars)—the underlying assumption that but-for causation is truly a 
conceptual requirement of actual causation with regard to a narrow 
band of cases.
19
  Group res ipsa cases, such as Ybarra, remain contro-
versial with regard to their acceptability, but there is less mystery about 
what drives them normatively:  a combination of policy motivations in-
tended to break a code of silence among interconnected defendants 
who close out access to evidence, and lingering doubts about whether 
some type of group agency theory really should apply.  This cluster of 
judicial motivations was palpably at work in a more contemporary case 
from Indiana.  Shepard ex rel. Shepard v. Porter involved a group of four 
friends walking behind the plaintiff, one of whom lit the plaintiff’s 
pants on fire, causing serious injury.
20
  The plaintiff was unable to 
identify which one did it, and none of the boys volunteered this in-
formation pre-trial; the court understandably preferred to force the 
 
18
See id. at 469. 
19
See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735, 1792-93 
(1985) (arguing that courts’ deviation from but-for causation standard in concurrent 
causation case is best interpreted as hinging on analysis of causation). 
20
679 N.E.2d 1383, 1386 (Ind. Ct. App. 1997). 
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information out at trial, rather than rewarding their evident pact of 
silence.
21
 
Geistfeld is right to pick market-share liability as a subdomain in 
which theorizing remains highly contested, and right to pick alterna-
tive liability as its closest cousin.  Moreover, the conditions for the ap-
plicability of market-share liability is a particularly timely topic, given 
the Wisconsin Supreme Court’s recent decision to permit market-
share liability (which it calls “risk-contribution theory”) in the domain 
of liability for lead-based paint.
22
  And, of course, the plaintiffs in Sin-
dell advocated the adoption of alternative liability from Summers.
23
  
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court in Sindell expressly re-
jected alternative liability,
24
 and Geistfeld never takes seriously its rea-
sons for doing so. 
By contrast, Arthur Ripstein and I offered an explanation that ac-
commodates both the similarities and the differences of the two.
25
  
Summers works because the defendant’s right is a right to be free of li-
ability where he did not cause the plaintiff’s injury, and respecting 
that right is inconsistent with imposing liability where it is more likely 
than not that the defendant caused no injury to the plaintiff.  But that 
leaves open the question, we argued, of what should happen in equi-
poise, where the probability is exactly fifty percent.  It is therefore 
permissible for the court to adopt rebuttable joint and several liability 
in the two-person Summers (the real Summers), but not in any more ex-
tended version.
26
 
 
21
See id. at 1389. 
22
Thomas ex rel. Gramling v. Mallet, 701 N.W.2d 523, 562 (Wis. 2005) (holding 
that “risk-contribution theory” developed in DES context is applicable to products li-
ability actions based on lead-based paint, notwithstanding substantial differences in 
product and context).  As the Thomas court recognized, the overwhelming majority of 
courts facing this question have rejected market-share liability for lead-based paint.  See, 
e.g., City of St. Louis v. Benjamin Moore & Co., 226 S.W.3d 110, 115-17 (Mo. 2007). 
23
Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 607 P.2d 924, 928 (Cal. 1980). 
24
See id. at 930-31. 
25
See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 243-44. 
26
One might object to our analysis—that we too readily adopt the artifice of the 
court in Summers, that the chance is exactly fifty percent as to each defendant that he 
committed a “completed” tort of negligence (rather than an inchoate, or unrealized 
tort).  After all, one might add, the evidence behind each of the other elements of the 
claim—especially breach—establishes the element by a preponderance, but perhaps 
somewhat less than one hundred percent.  However, if one were really to abstract away 
from the artificial framing of the problem in Summers, one might then reject the stipu-
lation of the parties that both pellets came from the same shotgun.  If one pellet came 
from each, then there would have been a completed tort by each defendant, and the 
dispute would only be about damages—a much easier case.  Indeed, in a case re-
markably similar to Summers, but plainly involving only one hit (a single bullet) coming 
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Sindell does not work under the Summers rationale, nor does mar-
ket-share liability more generally, we argued.
27
  However, so long as 
the court has before it as parties a domain of plaintiffs and defendants 
large enough to ensure that each defendant has in fact tortiously in-
jured a share of the plaintiffs before the court, then liability is really 
being imposed for injuries tortiously caused, not simply for tortious 
risk creation.  The form of market-share liability created and applied 
by the California Supreme Court in Sindell fits that analysis perfectly, 
but is peculiar to the constraints of that analysis. 
Geistfeld’s article pushes harder than anyone has done thus far on 
questions about evidential grouping.  For the reasons articulated, I do 
not think he has made out the case that all or even most factual sce-
narios falling under the conditions he enumerates qualify for such 
grouping, and I do not think that case can be made.  However, there 
may indeed be more types of evidential grouping that are permissible, 
there may be interconnections among those so far developed, and 
there may be as yet unearthed reasons underlying the superficially dis-
crete categories.  Those questions remain to be answered, but Geist-
feld is to be credited with forcing us to ask them. 
 
 
 
 
Preferred Citation:  Benjamin C. Zipursky, Response, Evidence, Unfair-
ness, and Market-Share Liability:  A Comment on Geistfeld, 156 U. PA. L. 
REV. PENNUMBRA 126 (2007), http://www.pennumbra.com/ 
responses/market-share_liability.pdf. 
 
 
from one of two hunters, a Minnesota appellate court rejected liability.  See Leuer v. 
Johnson, 450 N.W.2d 363, 364-67 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990). 
27
See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 243-44. 
